The US Army War College Quarterly: Parameters
Volume 52
Number 3 Volume 52, Number 3 Autumn Issue

Article 9

8-25-2022

Meeting the US Military’s Manpower Challenges
Stefan Borg

Follow this and additional works at: https://press.armywarcollege.edu/parameters

Recommended Citation
Stefan Borg, "Meeting the US Military’s Manpower Challenges," Parameters 52, no. 3 (2022), doi:10.55540/
0031-1723.3171.

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by USAWC Press. It has been accepted for inclusion in The
US Army War College Quarterly: Parameters by an authorized editor of USAWC Press.

Future Force Development

Meeting the US Military’s Manpower Challenges
Stefan Borg

©2022 Stefan Borg

ABSTRACT: Concerns raised over the impact of changing demographics,
domestic polarization, and the return of near-peer competition on US military
manpower challenges are overstated. Drawing on open-source materials and
interviews, this article discusses factors often neglected in conversations on
this topic and provides leadership and policymakers with a scholarly overview
of an important yet understudied issue facing the US armed forces.
Key words: manpower, demographic change, domestic polarization,
near-peer competition, US armed forces

T

he question of whether the manpower needs of the Armed Forces
might be solved with volunteers has been debated since the draft
was abolished and the all-volunteer force (AVF) introduced as
US operations in Vietnam began winding down in the early 1970s. The Gates
Commission, which examined the implications of moving to an all-volunteer
force, raised concerns about ending the draft. Would a career military become
increasingly isolated from the rest of US society? Would this isolation lead
to a military unrepresentative of the US population in terms of class and race?
Consequentially, would the broader public become less interested in US foreign
and security affairs?1 Moreover, Samuel Huntington famously argued that civilian
control would be harder to assert if a military organization is not representative of
its population.2 Over the years, experts and pundits have addressed these concerns
by arguing that reinstating the draft is the best way to meet future manpower
needs.3 Doing so is unpopular and unlikely to happen.
Nevertheless, manpower remains a central issue for the US military. In 2018, the
Army failed to meet its recruitment target for the first time since 2005, when the
Iraq War was at its peak, and there was widespread talk of an emerging “manpower
crisis” in the Army and the military at large. Unlike strategy and weapon systems
The author gratefully acknowledges very helpful discussion on the themes of this article with Mark Cancian
(CSIS), Anthony Cordesman (CSIS), Eric Gomez (CATO), and Kate Kuzminski (CNAS) and also thanks
Professor Kjell Engelbrekt and Associate Professor Antoine Bousquet, as well as two anonymous reviewers, for
helpful feedback. The views expressed in this article, however, are the sole responsibility of the author.l
1. President’s Commission on an All-Volunteer Armed Force, The Report of the President’s Commission on
an All-Volunteer Armed Force (Washington, DC: Government Publishing Office, 1970), https://www
.nixonfoundation.org / wp- content / uploads / 2012 / 01 / The - Report-Of -The -Presidents- Commission-On -An - AllVolunteer-Armed-Force.pdf.
2. Samuel Huntington, The Soldier and the State (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 1957).
3. See Thomas E. Ricks, “Let’s Draft Our Kids,” New York Times, July 9, 2012; and David Barno and
Nora Bensahel, “Why We Still Need the Draft,” War on the Rocks (website), February 23, 2016,
https://warontherocks.com/2016/02/why-we-still-need-the-draft/.
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questions, manpower issues remain understudied in the scholarly community. This
article examines the current manpower challenges in the US military within the
context of changing demographics, increased domestic polarization, and a change
in strategic focus to near-peer competition. It argues that the long-term manpower
supply is not the crisis others have made it out to be despite the issues first raised
in 2018 and the additional problems arising from an increasingly polarized public.
The projected 2050 recruitment pool is sufficient to meet the Army’s needs, and the
Army should focus on modernization and investment in high-end technologies to
meet the challenges posed by near-peer competition with China and Russia.
This article examines the main factors influencing recruitment and retention
numbers, the changing demographic facing the US military, the significance of
domestic polarization, and the manpower challenges caused by the strategic shift
to near-peer competition. The final section summarizes the main findings.

Recruitment and Retention
Recruitment and retention are core concerns for staffing organizations,
including militaries. Much of the discussion of manpower challenges facing the
US military focuses on recruitment rather than retention. In the last few years,
retention goals have mostly been met or exceeded, and retaining personnel is,
therefore, usually considered less of an issue than recruitment—except for female
retention, which is considerably lower than male retention.4
Applicant numbers increased dramatically following 9/11, and the 2008
economic recession further bolstered these numbers. Then, combat operations
were gradually cut back in Iraq and then Afghanistan, reducing the number of
recruits needed.5 In 2018, however, the Army failed to meet its recruitment target
for the first time since 2005, when the Iraq War was at its peak, and there was
widespread talk of an emerging “manpower crisis” in the Army.6 This failure, which
likely resulted from the booming US economy at the time, provoked debate within
the Army about future recruitment efforts. While all service branches reached
their 2020 and 2021 targets, many believe this achievement was due to the weak

4. Ben Werner, “GAO: Women 28 Percent More Likely to Leave Military Service than Men,”
USNI News (website), May 20, 2020, https://news.usni.org/2020/05/20/gao-women-28-percent-more-likely-to
-leave-military-service-than-men.
5. Meghann Myers, “The Army Needs to Attract Gen Z’s Best and Brightest, So It’s Working on Its Sales
Pitch,” Army Times (website), November 14, 2018, https://www.armytimes.com/news/your-army/2018/11/14
/the-army-needs-to-attract-gen-zs-best-and-brightest-so-its-working-on-its-sales-pitch/.
6. James Long, “It’s Not the Economy: Why the Army Missed Its Recruitment Goals and What to Do
about It,” Modern War Institute at West Point (website), February 14, 2019, https://mwi.usma.edu/not-economy
-army-missed-recruitment-goals/; and Dennis Laich, “Commentary: Recruiting’s Slippery Slope,” Army Times
(website), July 27, 2018, https://www.armytimes.com/opinion/commentary/2018/07/28/recruitings-slippery
-slope/.
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COVID-19 afflicted economy.7 In the competitive 2022 job market, all service
branches experienced difficulties meeting recruitment targets, raising alarms about
the challenges of maintaining a large enough force.8
From the quality of applicants to the state of the economy, many factors impact
recruitment numbers. First, scholars have observed a strong correlation between
unemployment and higher recruitment and retention. In a strong economy,
there are naturally more options for people considering leaving the armed
forces.9 Hence, some analysts believe the uncertain post–COVID-19 economy
may provide fertile ground for military recruiters.10 Second, the total pool the
military recruits from is small. Moreover, awareness of what a military career
entails among youth is limited; 50 percent of youth claim to “know little” about
serving in the US military.11 Studies have shown that approximately 136,000
individuals of the 33-million Americans between 17 and 24 meet the minimum
enlistment standards and express a willingness to serve. According to 2017
Pentagon data, over 70 percent of Americans between 17 and 24 are ineligible
to serve in the military—meaning 24 million individuals from the 33-million
pool do not meet miimum enlistment requirements.12 A 2018 Heritage
Foundation report described these numbers as an “alarming situation which
threatens the country’s fundamental national security.”13 The main reasons for
ineligibility were lack of education, previous criminal records, and obesity.
Many eligible recruits are from military families, which opponents of the
all-volunteer force feared would happen. They believe this tendency led to the

7. Guest Editorial, “US Military Needs Recruits,” Day (website), July 15, 2021, https://www.theday.com
/article/20210715/OP01/210719637; and Ellie Kaufmann, “US Military Struggled to Attract National
Guard and Reserve Troops but Met Targets for Full-time Recruits in 2021 Fiscal Year,” CNN (website),
January 19, 2022, https://edition.cnn.com/2022/01/14/politics/military-recruitment-numbers-2021/index.html.
8. Courtney Kube and Molly Boignon, “Every Branch of the Military Is Struggling to Make Its 2022
Recruiting Goals, Officials Say,” NBC News (website), June 27, 2022, https://www.nbcnews.com/news/military
/every-branch-us-military-struggling-meet-2022-recruiting-goals-officia-rcna35078; and Thomas Spoehr,
“Military Recruiting Faces Its Biggest Challenges in Years,” May 13, 2022, https://www.heritage.org/defense
/commentary/military-recruiting-faces-its-biggest-challenge-year.
9. John T. Warner, “The Effect of the Civilian Economy on Recruiting and Retention,” in Report of the
Eleventh Quadrennial Review of Military Compensation: Supporting Research Papers (Washington, DC:
Department of Defense, 2012), https://militarypay.defense.gov/Portals/3/Documents/Reports/11th_QRMC
_Supporting_Research_Papers_(932pp)_Linked.pdf.
10. Meghann Myers, “In Uncertain Economic Times, Some of the Services Are Upping Their Recruiting
Goals,” Military Times (website), February 2, 2021, https://www.militarytimes.com/news/your-military
/2021/02/02/in-uncertain-economic-times-some-of-the-services-are-upping-their-recruiting-goals/.
11. US Army Public Affairs, “Recruiting Facts and Figures,” US Army Recruiting Command (website), n.d.,
https://recruiting.army.mil/pao/facts_figures/.
12. Meghann Myers, “Top Recruiter: Just 136,000 Out of 33 Million Young Americans Would Join the
Army,” Army Times (website), October 12, 2017, https://www.armytimes.com/news/your-army/2017/10/12/top
-recruiter-just-136000-out-of-33-million-young-americans-would-join-the-army/.
13. Thomas Spoehr and Bridget Handy, “The Looming National Security Crisis: Young Americans Unable
to Serve in the Military,” Heritage Foundation (website), February 13, 2018, https://www.heritage.org/defense
/report/the-looming-national-security-crisis-young-americans-unable-serve-the-military.
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unintended creation of an American “warrior caste.”14 So-called “professional
inheritance” is not exclusive to the military. Many occupations display similar
tendencies, such as US police forces. However, 2015 Department of Defense
data indicated that over 25 percent of new recruits have a parent who previously
served in the military.15 In itself, professional inheritance is not a problem, but
it could become one if the appearance of a “family business” impedes efforts to
reach new demographics.
When assessing the current state of recruitment, military leadership should
consider trends likely to impact the recruiting pool in the medium- to long-term
future. First, there does not seem to be much cause for alarm regarding high-school
completion rates, and there are few reasons to believe the situation will deteriorate
further. The National Center for Education Statistics reports the graduation rate
for public high-school students in 2018 was 85 percent—the highest rate since it
was first measured in 2010–11.16 Although the federal government has a limited
role in the education system, the Biden-Harris administration invests heavily in
school districts with a higher proportion of low-income students, which should
encourage the positive trend in high-school graduation rates.17
Second, the number of Americans with criminal records is high—as many
as one in three US adults is estimated to have a criminal record.18 The service
branches often grant waivers for minor offenses, and over time, the percentage of
waivers has closely reflected recruitment needs.
Third, unlike education and criminal records, obesity is not improving,
particularly in the southern United States, which provides a disproportionally
large number of recruits.19 There are strategies, however, to help potential recruits
deal with obesity. Local recruitment offices often run informal fitness camps to

14. Amy Schafer, “Generations of War: The Rise of the Warrior Caste and the All-Volunteer Force,” Center
for a New American Security (website), May 8, 2017, https://www.cnas.org/publications/reports/generations
-of-war.
15. Kristy N. Kamarck, Diversity, Inclusion, and Equal Opportunity in the Armed Services: Background
and Issues for Congress, Congressional Research Service (CRS) Report R44321 (Washington, DC: CRS,
June 5, 2019), 58.
16. “Public High School Graduation Rates,” National Center for Education Statistics (website), May 2021,
https://nces.ed.gov/programs/coe/indicator/coi/high-school-graduation-rates.
17. Nicholas Tampio, “How Biden’s Request for More Education Funding Would Shift More Power to the
Federal Government,” Conversation (website), April 26, 2021, https://theconversation.com/how-bidens-request
-for-more-education-funding-would-shift-more-power-to-the-federal-government-159489.
18. Rebecca Vallas, Sharon Dietrich, and Beth Avery, “A Criminal Record Shouldn’t Be a Life Sentence to
Poverty,” Center for American Progress (website), May 28, 2021, https://www.americanprogress.org/article
/criminal-record-shouldnt-life-sentence-poverty-2/.
19. Craig M. Hales, Margaret D. Carroll, Cheryl D. Fryar, and Cynthia L. Ogden, “Prevalence of
Obesity and Severe Obesity among Adults: United States, 2017–2018,” National Center for Health Statistics
Data Brief No. 1, National Center for Health Statistics (website), February 2020, https://www.cdc.gov/nchs
/products/databriefs/db360.htm.
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get potential recruits in good enough physical shape to enlist.20 Current recruiting
and retention have challenges and problem areas, but there are many ways to work
around these issues.

Shifting Demographics and Manpower Challenges
Although the military has found ways to address current challenges, the
United States is experiencing rapid demographic shifts that will raise new issues.
The US Census Bureau projects that the United States will become “minority
white” around 2045, meaning the white population will constitute less than
50 percent of the total population.21 As a result, future military ranks will be more
racially and ethnically diverse. In response to these projections, the Department
of Defense implemented various diversity initiatives that have been debated
for decades. Addressing diversity and inclusivity within the armed forces is “a
strategic imperative,” with implications for the future ability to carry out grand
strategy.22 A growing emphasis on diversity in all US sectors has also impacted
the armed forces.
The military has made significant progress in diversifying its workforce
overall, and the composition of all active-duty personnel closely reflects the
ethnic/racial composition of the US population.23 The senior officer corps,
however, is still significantly less diverse than the US population. Moreover,
the majority of recruits come from middle-class backgrounds, and are not
disproportionately recruited among poor Americans, as observers critical of
US foreign policy sometimes claim.24 Women remain underrepresented at all
levels (around 16 percent), and ethnic and racial minorities are underrepresented
at higher ranks.25 As of May 2018, Black Americans made up 16.8 percent of
active-duty personnel, with a total share of 13.7 percent of the US resident
20. Yuki Noguchi, “Fighting Weight: How Military Recruiters Take on Obesity, Case by Case,” National
Public Radio (website), May 17, 2021, https://www.npr.org/sections/health-shots/2021/05/17/994241471
/fighting-weight-how-military-recruiters-take-on-obesity-case-by-case?t=1652777676533.
21. William H. Frey, “The US Will Become ‘Minority White’ in 2045, Census Projects: Youthful Minorities
Are the Engines of Future Growth,” Brookings Institution, Avenue (blog), March 14, 2018, https://www
.brookings.edu/blog/the-avenue/2018/03/14/the-us-will-become-minority-white-in-2045-census-projects/. At
the same time, what might happen is more Hispanics will start self-identifying as whites. See Ezra Klein, Why
We’re Polarized (New York: Avid Reader Press, 2020), 106.
22. Department of Defense (DoD), Department of Defense Board on Diversity and Inclusion Report:
Recommendations to Improve Racial and Ethnic Diversity and Inclusion in the U.S. Military (Washington, DC:
DoD, December 18, 2020) 43, https://media.defense.gov/2020/Dec/18/2002554852/-1/-1/0/DOD
-DIVERSITY-AND-INCLUSION-FINAL-BOARD-REPORT.PDF.
23. Helene Cooper, “African-Americans Are Highly Visible in the Military, but Almost Invisible at the Top,”
New York Times (website), May 20 2020, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/25/us/politics/military-minorities
-leadership.html.
24. Andrea Asoni, Andrea Gilli, Mauro Gilli, and Tino Sanandaji, “A Mercenary Army of the Poor?
Technological Change and the Demographic Composition of the Post-9/11 U.S. Military,” Journal of Strategic
Studies 45, no. 4 (January 30, 2020): 568–614, https://doi.org/10.1080/01402390.2019.1692660.
25. Lori Robinson and Michael E. O’Hanlon, “Women Warriors: The Ongoing Story of Integrating and
Diversifying the American Armed Forces,” Brookings (website), May 2020, https://www.brookings.edu/essay
/women-warriors-the-ongoing-story-of-integrating-and-diversifying-the-armed-forces.
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population ages 18 to 64.26 In the officer corps only, Black representation
decreases to 8.1 percent. Within the top echelons of the armed forces
(generals/flag officers), Black representation amounts to 8 percent. When
examining the top 41 most senior commanders (four-star ranking) in 2021, two
are Black, and one is a woman.27 Under Joe Biden’s presidency, the Department
of Defense has prioritized diversity, equity, and inclusion initiatives to ensure the
military remains an attractive career choice for minorities.28 When it comes to
female retention, momentum is building in Congress to change how the military
deals with sexual violence within the services. These potential changes may
facilitate the retention and recruitment of women. Whether such efforts will yield
tangible results remains to be seen.

Domestic Polarization and Manpower Challenges
A tendency toward polarization may be understood as foundational to
the US political system, which combines a majoritarian electoral system with
strong support for minority interests. To fully comprehend the challenges of a
rapidly diversifying population, one needs to examine how the military has been
impacted by increased domestic polarization in recent decades. Many Democratic
voters moved to the left. In what a Vox journalist called “a Great Awokening,”
White Democrats have changed their political preferences to the left over the
last few years, especially in terms of social justice issues such as race.29 Political
scientist Lilliana Mason has shown how a variety of social, economic, religious,
and racial cleavages have aligned themselves into a simple binary—Republican
or Democrat. She argues Donald Trump’s election may be understood as “the
culmination of a long process by which the American electorate has become
deeply divided along partisan lines.”30 By the end of Trump’s presidency,
analysts at the Pew Research Center concluded “Americans have rarely been as
polarized as they are today.”31
The controversies surrounding the military’s diversity initiatives must be
understood within the context of an increasingly polarized society. The most
26. Numbers are taken from Kamarck, Diversity, Inclusion, and Equal Opportunity.
27. Robert Burns and Lolita C. Baldor, “Top US General Urges Greater Racial Diversity in Military,”
Associated Press (website), May 5, 2021, https://apnews.com/article/race-and-ethnicity-government-and
-politics-1deffc0ef b652716aa44dab756b614d1.
28. Terri Moon Cronk, “Austin Speaks Out on Importance of Diversity in White House Roundtable,” DoD
(website), February 10, 2022, https://www.defense.gov/News/News-Stories/Article/Article/2930883/austin
-speaks-out-on-importance-of-diversity-in-white-house-roundtable/.
29. Matthew Yglesias, “The Great Awokening,” Vox (website), April 1, 2019, https://www.vox
.com/2019/3/22/18259865/great-awokening-white-liberals-race-polling-trump-2020.
30. Lilliana Mason, Uncivil Agreement: How Politics Became Our Identity (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
2018), 3.
31. Michael Dimock and Richard Wike, “America Is Exceptional in the Nature of Its Political Divide,” Pew
Research Center (website), November 13, 2020, https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2020/11/13/america-is
-exceptional-in-the-nature-of-its-political-divide/.
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controversial parts of diversity initiatives are wholly or partly based on critical
race theory (CRT).32 A slide with information on “white privilege,” a key concept
within critical race theory, was included in a 2015 diversity training session at
Fort Gordon, Georgia, drawing criticism. An Army spokesperson immediately
backtracked and said that the slide’s content was not authorized.33 The Trump
administration banned federal diversity training based on CRT precepts in
September 2020, and the service branches then canceled contracts with contractors
who provided diversity training based on critical race theory.
Critical race theory, however, continued to gain traction in an increasingly
polarized domestic setting. On his first day in office, Biden rescinded the ban, and
Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III issued a memo instructing the armed
forces to resume CRT-based diversity training.34 Scattered reports of pushback
started to appear shortly after the memo’s release. For instance, a high-profile
incident erupted around the incorporation of critical race theory in workshops on
equity, diversity, and inclusion conducted at the United States Military Academy. In
April 2021, Congressman Mike Waltz (Florida Sixth Congressional District) sent
a letter to Lieutenant General Darryl A. Williams, superintendent of the United
States Military Academy, characterizing this training as “inflammatory” and
“detrimental to the mission and morale of the U.S. Army.”35 Some commentators
and members of Congress have gone so far as to speak of a “woke military.”36
The high degree of contestation surrounding military diversity initiatives
presents challenges for recruitment efforts. The military needs to remain
an attractive career choice for minorities since the US population is rapidly
diversifying. Therefore, recruiters are actively attempting to attract minorities.
Although recent data on political preference within the military is lacking,
available research suggests conservatives are overrepresented within the military,
particularly among officers.37 Given the polarized public, one may suspect some
32. See John McWhorter, “John McWhorter on How Critical Race Theory Poorly Serves Its Intended
Beneficiaries,” Economist (website), May 24, 2021, https://www.economist.com/by-invitation/2021/05/24
/john-mcwhorter-on-how-critical-race-theory-poorly-serves-its-intended-beneficiaries; and Jason Stanley
“Jason Stanley on Critical Race Theory and Why It Matters,” Economist (website), May 24, 2021, https://www
.economist.com/by-invitation/2021/05/24/jason-stanley-on-critical-race-theory-and-why-it-matters.
33. Tom Vanden Brook, “Army Says Diversity Training Sent Wrong Signal,” USA Today (website),
April 3, 2015, https://eu.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2015/04/03/army-diversity-training/25250733/.
34. Stephen Losey, “The Military Is Resuming the Diversity Training That Trump Banned,” Military
(website), March 8, 2021, https://www.military.com/daily-news/2021/03/08/military-resuming-diversity
-training-trump-banned.html.
35. “Press Release: Waltz Requests Critical Race Theory Materials & Presentations from West Point,”
Mike Waltz (website), April 8, 2021, https://waltz.house.gov/news/documentsingle.aspx?DocumentID=486.
36. Konstantin Toropin, ”Top Leaders Again Reject Claims That Military Is Becoming Too “ ‘Woke,’ ”
Military (website), July 1, 2021, https://www.military.com/daily-news/2021/07/01/top-leaders-again-reject
-claims-military-becoming-too-woke.html.
37. Peter D. Feaver and Richard H. Kohn, eds., Soldiers and Civilians: The Civil-Military Gap and American
National Security (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2001); and Leo Shane III, “Troops See Rising Political Tension
in the Ranks, Poll Shows,” Military Times (website), October 17, 2018, https://www.militarytimes.com/news
/pentagon-congress/2018/10/17/troops-see-rising-political-tension-in-the-ranks-poll-shows/.
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officers are put off by too strident a focus on diversity, equity, and inclusion, as
seen in recent controversies surrounding diversity training based on critical race
theory, which some observers believe could be harmful to military effectiveness.38
Others are concerned diversity initiatives, to the extent that they involve informal
quotas or “soft” affirmative-action programs, would undermine the military’s
strict meritocratic system.39 The military will need to balance the appeal to ethnic
and racial minorities while not alienating rural Southern and more conservative
Americans who have traditionally been its largest recruiting pool.

Near-Peer Competition
The shift from focusing on anti-terrorist operations and counterinsurgency
(COIN) to near-peer competition with China and Russia raises new manpower
challenges. As the 2018 National Defense Strategy observed: “[i]nter-state
strategic competition, not terrorism, is now the primary concern in U.S. national
security.”40 This concern remains in the 2021 Interim National Security Strategic
Guidance and the 2022 National Defense Strategy. China and Russia, however,
are struggling with low birth rates that will affect their projected pool of recruits
in 2050. In 2050, the United States will have an estimated total recruitment
pool (ages 15 to 24) of 44 million people, compared to 138 million in China and
14.6 million in Russia.41 Given the total size of the US military has remained
stable since the end of the Cold War, these numbers, while important to monitor
carefully, should not cause concern.42
Further, the strategic focus on near-peer competition with China calls for
investment in expensive technologies rather than expanding conventional armies.43
With Russia, though, strategists see the need for retaining large conventional
armies. Following the Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, some
observers argued for an increased permanent presence of US troops in Eastern
Europe.44 As Mark Cancian pointed out, the scenarios considered most likely in
great-power conflict do not require large conventional ground forces. The Pacific
38. Kamarck, Diversity, Inclusion, and Equal Opportunity, 59–60; and Conner Bolanos and Thomas Spoehr,
“Military Readiness Takes Back Seat to Wokeness at the Pentagon,” Daily Signal (website), June 21, 2022,
https://www.dailysignal.com/2022/06/21/military-readiness-takes-back-seat-to-wokeness-at-the-pentagon.
39. Kamarck, Diversity, Inclusion, and Equal Opportunity, 59–60.
40. James N. Mattis, Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy of the United States of America: Sharpening
the American Military’s Competitive Edge (Washington, DC: DoD, 2018), 1, https://dod.defense.gov/Portals/1
/Documents/pubs/2018-National-Defense-Strategy-Summary.pdf.
41. United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs/Population Division, World Population
Prospects 2019: Demographic Profiles, vol. 2 (New York: United Nations, 2019), https://population.un.org/wpp
/publications/Files/WPP2019_Volume-II-Demographic-Profiles.pdf.
42. Mark F. Cancian, discussion with author, September 2021.
43. Mark F. Cancian, “U.S. Military Forces in FY 2020: Army,” Center for Strategic and International Studies
(website), October 15, 2019, 4, https://www.csis.org/analysis/us-military-forces-fy-2020-army.
44. Michael E. O’Hanlon, “Strengthening the US and NATO Defense Postures in Europe after Russia’s
Invasion of Ukraine,” Brookings (website), June 21, 2022, https://www.brookings.edu/articles/strengthening
-the-us-and-nato-defense-postures-in-europe-after-russias-invasion-of-ukraine.
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theater consists mostly of oceans, and the geographical features involved in an
attack on the Baltic countries would make it difficult to deploy large numbers
of US ground forces.45 In addition, many US strategists believe Europeans
should assume more responsibility for their defense, freeing up American resources
for Asia.
To pay for expensive technologies, many strategists favor a reduction in force
size.46 In light of the strategic focus on China, the different service branches are
adopting their own approaches. Since the Navy and Air Force are likely to play
the most important roles in a conflict with China, the Army is likely to shrink.
The Army, however, would play a critical role in a conflict with Russia. At the
same time, it is trying to develop capabilities that will also be useful in the Pacific
theater, such as long-range anti-ship missiles.47 Even when large numbers of
ground combat troops are not needed, the Army has historically provided large
numbers of troops to support other services.
The Air Force will likely cut its force to finance modernization efforts. The
Marine Corps is currently restructuring its forces (Force Design 2030) for the
Pacific theater.48 It plans to shrink to pre-Iraq and pre-Afghanistan levels to pay
for long-range precision weapons and unmanned aerial vehicles.49 The Navy, for
some time, has been perceived as an outlier because it plans to grow its force
structure and increase its fleet considerably, though its earlier goal of reaching a
355-ship fleet collapsed due to staggering costs.50 Although Russia’s invasion of
Ukraine may delay the long overdue pivot to Asia, the future focus on China will
require modernization and investment in high-end technologies rather than large
numbers of troops.
Analysts agree the biggest challenge for the armed forces in an age of nearpeer competition is the quality rather than the quantity of servicemembers.51
Recruiting and retaining personnel with high-end technical and cyber skills,
(since the cyber domain is projected to increase rapidly) must be a priority. The
2018 National Defense Strategy highlights the necessity to modernize professional
45. Mark F. Cancian, “U.S. Military Forces in FY 2020: The Struggle to Align Forces with Strategy,” Center
for Strategic and International Studies (website), November 8, 2019, 17, https://www.csis.org/analysis/us
-military-forces-fy-2020-struggle-align-forces-strategy-1.
46. Mark F. Cancian, “U.S. Military Forces in FY 2021: The Last Year of Growth?,” Center for Strategic
and International Studies (website), March 18, 2021, vii, https://www.csis.org/analysis/us-military-forces-fy
-2021-last-year-growth.
47. Cancian, “Last Year of Growth.”
48. David Barno and Nora Bensahel, “A Striking New Vision for the Marines, and a Wakeup Call for the
Other Services,” War on the Rocks (website), October 1, 2019, https://warontherocks.com/2019/10/a-striking
-new-vision-for-the-marines-and-a-wakeup-call-for-the-other-services/.
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military education (PME), implement improved talent management, and better
utilize civilian workforce expertise.52 In May 2020 the Joint Chiefs of Staff issued
a vision and guidance for professional military educatoin and talent management,
noting “[t]he return of great power competition raises the stakes for readiness
and for innovation.”53 The document acknowledges the US military must prepare
for facing adversaries, which may outnumber US forces and possess technologies
equal to the United States, and provides a vision for a continuous PME and talent
management system that produces leaders who “achieve intellectual overmatch
against adversaries.”54
Prioritizing talent management is essential from a manpower perspective
since it makes the military a more attractive employer and helps recruitment and
retention. For some years, a better talent management system has been discussed.55
Essentially, the armed forces face the problem of moving from an industrial-era
model for labor force management, where individuals are interchangeable, to a
talent management model, where management must consider the particular
skills and knowledge of each individual.56 The Army has been using an online
marketplace—the Army Talent Alignment Process (ATAP)—for several years.
Officers may easily see available assignments for which they are qualified, rankorder their preferences, and upload their CVs. The system gives users recruiting
and designing PME programs a better overview of needed skills.57 While more
work is needed to improve talent management, its higher prioritization may
enhance personnel retention.

Conclusion
In 2018, analysts sounded the alarm when Army recruitment numbers were
not met for the first time in over a decade. On closer inspection, it turned out
71 percent of American youth did not meet minimum enlistment standards
due to obesity, previous criminal records, and lack of education. Recruitment
and retention numbers for all services recovered in the following years, and the
services met their fiscal year 2021 goals. In 2022, however, all service branches are

52. Mattis, Summary of 2018 National Defense Strategy, 1.
53. Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), Developing Today’s Joint Officers for Tomorrow’s Ways of War: The Joint Chiefs
of Staff Vision and Guidance for Professional Military Education & Talent Management (Washington, DC:
JCS, May 1, 2020), 2, https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/education/jcs_pme_tm_vision
.pdf?ver=2020-05-15-102429-817.
54. JCS, Developing Today’s Joint Officers.
55. See Brennan Randel, “The Army Has a Revolutionary New Talent Management System. Now We Have to
Make It Work,” Modern War Institute at West Point (website), December 23, 2019, https://mwi.usma.edu/army
-revolutionary-new-talent-management-system-now-make-work/.
56. Kate Kuzminski (Center for a New American Security), discussion with author, September 2021.
57. Duane A. Gamble, “Talent Management: Enabling Total Army Readiness,” US Army (website),
February 16, 2021, https://www.army.mil/article/242952/talent_management_enabling_total_army_readiness.
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struggling to meet recruitment targets, most likely due to the highly competitive
civilian US job market.
While acknowledging that manpower supply is a serious concern, this article
has argued that the notion of a “manpower crisis” needs to be nuanced. Although
the relatively small recruitment pool of qualified youth remains a serious challenge
for the armed forces, the underlying issues of obesity, previous criminal records,
and lack of education may, to various degrees, be worked around. Nor do all
of these issues trend in the wrong direction, particularly when it comes to the
educational attainment of young Americans.
The Department of Defense has historically found ways to overcome manpower
shortfalls.58 First, the Armed forces have used more contractors at home and
abroad. Contractors are less expensive and easier to recruit and terminate. The
US military has adopted a practice empoyed by private companies for a long
time—outsourcing certain activities that do not need a highly skilled workforce.
Outsourcing is problematic since the practice makes the military dependent on
a private sector driven by different incentives than the public sector. Second,
reservists have been used more efficiently—and could be used even more efficiently
if appropriately managed.
Third, the number of Department of Defense civilians has increased.
Over time, the military has shifted active-duty personnel functions to other
workforces to overcome recruitment and retention problems because active-duty
servicemembers are expensive. Although much of the discussion focuses on
recruitment, some analysts think retention is a more significant concern since it
is easier for the military to mask the numbers. Some believe the most talented
people tend to leave and continue their careers elsewhere.59
Finally, in light of the Biden-Harris administration’s prevailing focus on China,
there is pressure to prioritize technological modernization over a force structure
increase. Russia’s war in Ukraine may delay but will not fundamentally change
the long overdue pivot to Asia. The Marine Corps has led the way in this respect
and adopted a future vision based on a conflict scenario in the South China
Sea. Additionally, US leadership needs to focus on implementing better talent
management systems within the military that bolster the quality rather than
quantity of servicemembers. Although these actions are necessary for improvement,
in comparison to Russia and China, the future US recruitment pool in the
long-term looks good. While complacency about manpower challenges is never

58. Cancian, discussion with the author.
59. Anthony Cordesman, discussion with author, September 2021.
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a virtue, there should be no significant problems recruiting a sufficiently large force
in the medium- to long-term.
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